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Taxation of Business Income
Summary
As U.S. legislators struggle to balance the fiscal budget, tax reform and business income tax, often emerges at
the forefront of the discussion. Not all business income is taxed the same, creating great challenges in the
design of new tax policy. The implications arising from the different ways in which corporate and non-
corporate entities are taxed needs to be understood in order to anticipate how changes in tax policy could
affect businesses and their tax obligations.
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Most Democrats and Republicans agree 
that spending should be cut and revenues 
increased—but that, however, is the only 
thing on which they agree. Holding all else 
equal, tax revenues can be raised either by 
increasing tax rates or by increasing the 
tax base (i.e., the income subject to taxes). 
Democrats tend to favor increasing tax 
rates whereas Republicans support broad-
ening the tax base through growth and 
the curtailing of deductions (“loopholes”). 
Almost all of this debate centers on tax 
rates on individuals.
Interestingly, one aspect of tax policy on 
which both sides of the aisle seem to agree 
is the need to reduce the U.S. corporate tax 
rate. Currently, U.S. corporations face a top 
statutory tax rate of 35%. This rate is quite 
high as compared to other OECD coun-
tries, which assess an average rate of 24%.1 
Proposals for corporate tax reform suggest 
that the corporate tax rate should be reduced 
to 28%. The arguments supporting this rate 
cut generally claim that this reduction is 
necessary to make the U.S. competitive with 
other jurisdictions for the location of new 
businesses and, hence, economic growth.2 
Despite the ongoing debate on raising/
lowering individual and corporate tax rates, 
there is little clarity on lawmakers’ positions 
regarding business income, more generally. 
The issue is that many presume, wrongly, 
that all business income is taxed at corporate 
rates. However, this ignores businesses orga-
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nized as non-corporate organizations, such 
as sole proprietorships, partnerships, limited 
liability companies (LLCs), and S corpora-
tions: the bastions of small businesses and 
entrepreneurial capital. 
In terms of employment, the Small 
Business Administration and Census 
Bureau report that over 50% of the U.S. 
workforce is employed by firms with 500 
or fewer employees, with 30% employed by 
firms with no more than 100 employees. In 
terms of sheer numbers, sole proprietor-
ships are the most common form of business 
organization in the U.S. Small businesses 
have been lobbying heavily for some sort of 
potential reprieve from the reversion of indi-
vidual tax rates to pre-2003 levels, arguing 
that the rate increase will hurt their growth.3 
These groups maintain that the increase in 
personal tax rates will differentially affect 
small businesses relative to larger businesses. 
On the other hand, opponents claim 
that reductions in tax rates on non-corporate 
business income will simply be a windfall to 
wealthy taxpayers.4 
Both perspectives have merit. Non-
corporate small businesses income will face 
a tax increase AND there are significant 
amounts of non-corporate business income 
reported on returns of wealthy taxpayers. 
But I believe that many (but by no means 
all) of the “wealthy” taxpayers that pundits 
argue would unfairly benefit from a reduc-
tion in tax rates on non-corporate business 
income only appear wealthy because of the 
non-corporate business income that they 
report on their business returns.
In this paper, I will discuss the most 
common structures of legal entities for U.S. 
businesses (corporate and non-corporate 
forms), their tax treatment, their contri-
bution to U.S. tax revenues, and how the 
anticipated changes in tax policy could affect 
businesses tax obligations. By doing so, I 
hope to present readers with a deeper under-
standing of the issues affecting the tax bur-
dens of non-corporate business entities and 
the implications arising from the different 
ways in which corporate and non-corporate 
entities are taxed.
i.  
organizaTionaL  
sTrucTures
An entrepreneur who establishes a business 
has several legal options when selecting a 
structure for his/her enterprise. Although 
taxes most certainly play a significant role 
in the choice of entity, there are other legal 
and transactional cost considerations as 
well. For example, a small service provider 
(such as a landscaper) may not be interested 
in incurring the legal and accounting costs 
of setting up a business as a separate legal 
entity and so may choose simply to report 
business activity on his/her personal tax 
return. Each of the common organizational 
structures is discussed below: C corpora-
tions, sole proprietorships, S corporations, 
partnerships and LLCs. In addition to these 
four structures, the U.S. also has others for 
mutual funds (Regulated Investment Com-
panies, or RICs) and real estate (Real Estate 
Investment Trusts, or REITs) that are only 
available to be used in specific industries and 
thus will not be discussed in this brief.
c corporaTions
A C corporation is the basic structure 
subject to corporate taxation. C corpora-
tions are separate entities for both legal and 
tax purposes. From a legal perspective, the 
benefit of the C corporation structure is that 
its owners have limited liability, meaning 
that if the corporation declares bankruptcy, 
the owners simply lose their investment in 
the corporation. They cannot be pursued 
by the firm’s creditors. From a tax perspec-
tive, the U.S. subjects C corporations to a 
double taxation or “classical” regime. Under 
a classical regime, the corporation files a tax 
return, pays corporate taxes and then any 
profits owners earn from their investment 
in the corporation are taxed again. These 
investor profits can come directly from 
the C corporation in the form of either a 
share repurchase or a dividend. However, a 
corporation need not distribute its profits 
in order to trigger the second layer of tax. 
Secondary trading on the market results in 
the recognition of taxable capital gains, thus 
effectively subjecting the corporate profits to 
two layers of tax.5
For example, suppose a U.S. corporation 
earns $100 of pre-tax income. Assuming 
that the corporation faces a 35% tax rate, 
the firm will pay $35 in corporate taxes 
and there will be $65 of retained earnings 
available to be distributed to shareholders. 
Under the current tax regime, individual 
shareholders face a maximum tax rate of 
20% on dividends and up to a 39.6% tax rate 
on ordinary (i.e., non-investment) income. 
If the corporation distributes 10% of its 
after-tax profits, then the shareholders will 
receive a $6.50 dividend on which they 
will owe $1.30 in tax resulting in after-tax 
proceeds of $5.20. So, the $10 of pre-tax 
corporate profits represented by the dividend 
is effectively taxed at 48.0%. Note that the 
expiration of the 2003 tax rate reductions 
accompanied by the implementation of the 
3.8% Medicare tax on investment income 
(due to the Affordable Care Act) will result 
in the $10 of pre-tax corporate profits incur-
ring a combined tax rate of 63.21%.
The mitigation of double taxation of 
corporate profits was a key driver of the 
2003 reductions in the dividend and capital 
gains tax rates. Furthermore, avoiding the 
double taxation of corporate profits is one 
of the primary reasons for the popularity 
of conduit or pass-through organizational 
forms, which will be discussed below. 6 
Yet, despite the tax disadvantages 
described above, most large firms (e.g. Gen-
eral Electric, Dell, Boeing, Apple, Goldman 
Sachs, etc.) and a large fraction of medium-
sized firms are organized as C Corpora-
tions. Furthermore, C corporations have not 
 1 See http://taxfoundation.org/article/oecd-corporate-
income-tax-rates-1981-2012.
 2 See Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s February 
2012 testimony before the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee on “The President’s FY2012 Budget Proposal.”
 3 See the National Federation of Independent Business’s 
perspective on the individual rate increases: http://www.
nfib.com/advocacy/taxes.
 4 See the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities’ 2009 
study titled “Very few small business owners would face 
increases under president’s budget” by Chye-Ching 
Huang, Jason Levitis, and James Horney.
 5 Note that presumably the firm’s retention of its profits 
results in the appreciation of the equity.
 6 As an aside, many countries have an imputation or frank-
ing system to mitigate double taxation (e.g., Australia, 
U.K.). These systems eliminate the double taxation of 
corporate profits by effectively attaching some (or all) of 
the corporate tax payment to the dividend in the form of 
a tax credit thereby reducing the individual shareholder’s 
dividend-related tax obligation.
 7 For example, in the 1950s-1970s, C corporations faced 
tax rates around 48% whereas individuals’ top tax rates 
varied between 70 and 90%. 
 8 There are some special taxes assessed on pass-throughs 
to prevent abusive behavior. The built-in-gain sting tax on 
S Corporations and the tax treatment of publicly-traded 
partnerships are examples.
always been tax-disfavored relative to other 
organizational forms.7 Many organizations 
may have selected the C corporation form 
based on past tax regimes and, once an 
enterprise is a C corporation, it can be very 
difficult, if not impossible, for the enterprise 
to convert to a conduit. 
conduiT or pass-Through 
sTrucTures
Conduit or pass-through entities are a 
category of organizational structures that are 
generally subject to only one layer of tax.8 
They are designated as “conduit” entities 
because their income passes through the 
entity and is taxed in the hands of its own-
ers. Since conduits are not taxed separately, 
the income maintains its character as it 
flows through to the returns of its owners. 
So, unlike C corporations, where income is 
effectively converted to either dividends or 
capital gains, conduit entities typically result 
in their owners reporting ordinary income.9
Because Treasury exempts pass-
throughs from two layers of tax, it places 
limitations on the attributes of the enti-
ties eligible to operate in such forms. For 
example, S corporations are only allowed to 
have 100 shareholders (and partnerships, 
corporations, and foreign individuals are 
ineligible shareholders) and one class of 
stock. Partnerships and LLCs, on the other 
hand, are precluded from accessing public 
equity unless their income is predominantly 
passive in nature (e.g., dividends, interest, 
capital gains, etc.).10 There are no IRS-spe-
cific limitations on sole proprietorships, but 
these entities are somewhat disadvantaged 
as they provide no legal protection for their 
owners. In addition, sole proprietorships 
imply one owner, so there is no mechanism 
for a sole proprietorship to have additional 
investors. Although sole proprietorships, S 
corporations, partnerships, and LLCs each 
differ in form, the impact of taxes on these 
entities’ after-tax returns (or cash flows) is 
quite similar. 
Figure 1A shows that sole proprietor-
ships are the most common form of business 
organization. But in 2008, they reported less 
than 20% of aggregate U.S. business income 
(Figure 1B), implying that the average sole 
proprietorship is quite small. Overall, Fig-
ures 1A and 1B demonstrate that conduits 
constitute a significant and growing portion 
of U.S. taxable income. 
To compare the aggregate tax burden 
of the conduit to that of the C corporation, 
I rely on the same fact pattern outlined 
above in the C corporation example. If the 
conduit has $100 of pre-tax income, all $100 
must pass through and be reported on its 
owners’ tax returns. Note that the income 
is reported by the owners on their returns 
regardless of whether the conduit entity 
distributes any cash. Assuming that owners 
face a 39.6% statutory tax rate, they will 
report the $100 and owe taxes of $39.60 to 
the U.S. tax authorities. Cash distributed by 
the conduit does not create any incremen-
tal tax liability.11 If the conduit distributes 
cash to its owners, suppose $5.20 (i.e., the 
after-tax cash owners of the C corporation 
received), this amount would not create any 
incremental tax obligation. However, notice 
that the owners have a net cash outflow 
of $34.40 related to their investment in 
the conduit—the $39.60 paid to the tax 
authorities less the $5.20 received from the 
business. To prevent conduit-related tax 
obligations from negatively affecting owners’ 
cash flow, conduit entities often have tax 
sharing agreements that require the entity to 
distribute a percentage of its profits (usually 
pre-tax income times the top personal statu-
tory tax rate) to its owners to cover their tax 
obligations. 
With a tax sharing agreement in place, 
the conduit will distribute $39.60 in cash 
to its owners for tax purposes in addition to 
the $5.20 of cash described above. Under 
 9 Each category of income or deduction that may have 
a special tax treatment (called separately stated items) 
in the hands of its owners maintains its character as it 
passes through to owners. For example, any dividends, 
capital gains, or tax credits are broken out in the conduit’s 
tax reporting as the owners may face beneficial tax rates 
(as is the case with dividends or capital gains) or particular 
limitations (e.g., tax credits and Section 179 accelerated 
depreciation).
 10 The publicly traded partnership (or PTP) rules effectively 
subject the partnership to corporate tax rules if the part-
nership is listed on an exchange – i.e. double taxation. 
However, if the PTP only participates in passive income 
activities, it may maintain its pass-through status (i.e., 
private equity). 
 11 This assumes that the shareholder has basis in their 
shares that equals the amount of the distribution. Basis 
is roughly what the investor paid for his/her ownership 
interest plus (minus) the conduit’s profits (losses) minus 
any distributions to owners.
 12 Investors in conduit entities may only use losses to offset 
other income if the investor is an active participant in the 
underlying business (i.e., the investment is not passive).
 13 Matthew Knittel, Susan Nelson, Jason DeBacker, John 
Kitchen, James Pearce, and Richard Prisinzano, “Meth-
odology to Identify Small Businesses and Their Owners,” 
Office of Tax Analysis, Technical Paper 4, August 2011. 
Using a sample of 2007 returns, the authors define non-
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Data for this Figure was obtained from the Statistics of Income data found on the IRS website.
business entities to be those that either have $5,000 or 
less of deductions or total income or deductions (the sum 
of total income and deductions) of $10,000 ($15,000) or 
less. Any business filing that has $10 million or less of 
total income and total deductions are classified as small 
businesses.
 14 See Robert M. Solow Growth Theory: An Exposition. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. Neoclassical 
economic theory predicts that growth merely depends on 
the accumulation of capital (both physical – such as prop-
erty, plant and equipment; and human - workforce). In the 
long-run, the level of taxes affects the optimal weighting 
between the two types of capital, but not the level of 
growth. Rather, growth is effectively pre-determined 
based on the technological progress of the economy. 
So, when there is greater technological innovation, there 
will be greater economic growth irrespective of tax policy. 
However, changes in tax policy are predicted to create 
transitory growth as the economy reallocates between 
physical and human capital. For example, if new technol-
ogy is discovered then firms may invest more in new 
workers or in the education of its existing workers. Note 
that under the neoclassical theory, the transitory effects of 
a tax change can reverberate over decades.
 15 See Roger H. Gordon and Yong Lee, “Tax Structure and 
Economic Growth,” Journal of Public Economics 89 
(5-6), 2005, p.1027-1043 and Robert E. Hall and Dale 
W. Jorgenson, “Tax Policy and Investment Behavior.” 
this scenario, the conduit will have $55.20 of 
profits retained inside the conduit (less than 
the $58.50 of “retained earnings” in the C 
corporation example). However, as the $5.20 
additional distribution does not create an 
incremental tax burden (i.e., it is not con-
sidered a dividend), the owners are able to 
retain the entire $5.20. As a result, the effec-
tive tax rate on the profits of the conduit is 
39.6%—only the shareholder level tax.
iii.  
TaxaTion of conduiTs  
and c corporaTions:  
a comparison
There is a conundrum created in the above 
example. Notice that although the aggregate 
tax rate on the distributed profits is less for 
the conduit (39.6% v. 48%), the conduit 
entity and its owners actually end up paying 
more tax than the C corporation and its 
shareholders ($39.60 v. $36.30). This incre-
mental tax of $3.30 is primarily attributable 
to the conduit income being taxed at the 
higher individual ordinary rates. The C cor-
poration would have to increase its dividend 
to $23.00 before the aggregate tax liability 
of the C corporation and its shareholders is 
as great as the burden on the conduit and its 
owners. 
The relative tax advantage of the 
conduit hinges critically on the timing of 
the second layer of corporate tax. If a C 
corporate shareholder intends to hold an 
investment for his/her lifetime, as would 
often be the case in a family-run business, 
then the present value of the tax on the sale 
of the organization is very small. Similarly, 
reinvestment of profits in a corporation 
decreases current period payout (dividends 
or repurchases), also decreasing the present 
value of any investor-level tax. 
Another important consideration in the 
choice between C corporations and pass-
through structures is the treatment of losses. 
Just as a conduit entity passes through all 
items of income, it also passes through 
losses.12 Owners may then use these losses 
to offset other items of income on their tax 
returns. C corporations must retain all losses 
inside the corporation. These corporate 
losses, called net operating losses, are only 
available to offset future income of the C 
corporation. This asymmetric treatment of 
losses is one reason that the conduit entity is 
preferred over the C corporation for start-up 
businesses. Because conduit owners are able 
to use the losses from the conduit to shield 
other income (perhaps wage income from 
a spouse), then the losses can effectively 
provide another source of financing for the 
pass-through (as the owner now has more 
available capital to invest).
Although it is very costly for a profit-
able C corporation to convert to a conduit, 
it is relatively straightforward for a conduit 
to convert to a C corporation. Typically, 
once an enterprise requires access to external 
capital markets to raise funds for growth, it 
becomes a C corporation. C corporations 
provide the easiest mechanism to sell owner-
ship to a diffuse investor base and are also 
afforded the opportunity to defer taxation 
on foreign earnings (an option not available 
to conduit entities). There are some publicly-
traded partnerships (PTPs) that trade on 
major exchanges. However, the IRS limits 
the types of income that these entities can 
earn to qualifying passive income (i.e., rents, 
royalties, capital gains, dividends, interest 
etc.). If a PTP is found to have significant 
non-qualifying income, the PTP will be 
taxed as a C corporation.
iV.  
WhaT Types and size  
of Businesses are repre-
senTed By conduiTs?
Debate about the effects of individual tax 
rate increases on pass-through entities cen-
ters on their potentially deleterious effects 
on the growth of small businesses and entre-
preneurial endeavors. But there is enormous 
variation in the types of businesses using the 
pass-through structure. Investment partner-
ships use the conduit form to hold portfolio 
assets, allowing the tax-efficient sharing 
of risk across partners. Law firms, medical 
practices, and accounting firms are but a 
few of the categories of professional service 
firms that rely on pass-through structures. 
Although sole proprietorships are the most 
common form of conduit, many of these 
filings represent taxpayers who are indepen-
dent contractors (i.e., their pay is reported 
on a 1099-MISC instead of a W-2). For 
these taxpayers, the income from the sole 
proprietorship is almost identical to salary. 
To evaluate entities whose tax returns 
often include business activities, a group 
from the Office of Tax Analysis (OTA) cre-
ated a methodology to distinguish between 
business and non-business activity, and 
then between large and small businesses.13 
Ultimately, 55% of conduit entities are clas-
sified as businesses, 99% of which are “small” 
businesses. Business activity represents 93% 
of the net income reported on pass-through 
returns, whereas small business activity 
represents 25% of pass-throughs’ reported 
net income. 
This OTA study also seeks to identify 
what portion of the businesses’ pass-through 
income is reported on high tax rate personal 
returns—i.e., those that would be affected 
by potential individual income tax rate 
increases. Of personal income tax returns 
reporting business income (as defined by 
the study), 12% represent taxpayers with 
adjusted gross income (AGI) of $200,000 or 
more. These 12% of taxpayers report 79% of 
all business income. Consistent with small 
businesses reporting lower levels of income 
(which is by the study’s design), 11% of 
personal tax returns reporting small business 
income have AGIs of at least $200,000 and 
they report 64% of the aggregate net income 
of the small business. Roughly half of all 
personal returns reporting large business 
American Economic Review 57, p. 391-414, June 1967.
 16 Note that there does appear to be some evidence that 
any positive response of publicly traded C corporations 
to the rate cut be attenuated by undesirable financial 
reporting consequences. Because accounting for income 
taxes can result in C corporations reporting future tax 
benefits as assets on their balance sheets, any rate 
reduction effectively reduces these assets resulting in a 
reduction in both net income and total assets in the year 
of the rate reduction.  I believe that only a few groups of 
firms face this unintended consequence – banks which 
typically have large deferred tax assets associated with 
their loan loss reserves and firms with large net operating 
losses. This effect is not trivial for financial institutions 
as the asset write-down could hurt regulatory capital. I 
suspect that loss firms are less sensitive to the financial 
reporting outcome of their loss revaluation. See Michelle 
Hanlon’s February 8, 2012 testimony before the United 
States House Ways and Means Committee.
 17 That is not to say that the increases on investment 
income do not have an impact on the allocation of capital 
between investments (i.e., when dividend tax rates are 
high, holding all else equal, investors likely prefer holding 
investments that generate greater capital gains relative to 
dividends). But I am presuming that when choosing to 
enter into any investment, that the potential premium paid 
by future owners is taxed in the same manner regardless 
of whether the investment is a C corporation or a pass-
income face AGIs of $200,000 or more and 
these taxpayers report 106% of the large 
business net income. Overall, it appears 
quite clear that a large share of conduit 
entities will be affected by the increase in 
personal tax rates. 
V.  
impacT of The proposed 
raTe changes
corporaTe raTe reducTion
Research generally suggests that lowering 
the tax rate on C corporations increases 
growth.14 So, it seems likely that any reduc-
tion of the corporate tax rate will promote 
growth in the corporate sector.15,16 To the 
extent these reductions are accompanied by 
increasing rates elsewhere, these beneficial 
effects may be partially offset.
indiViduaL income Tax raTe 
increase
Proposed changes in individual tax rates 
affect the ordinary income tax rates as well 
as the tax rates on dividends and capital 
gains. For purposes of the discussion of 
the effects of tax rate changes on business 
income, I am going to ignore the increases 
in taxes on investment income and focus on 
the tax increase on business income.17 
Upon any increase in individual tax 
rates, the income of conduit businesses is 
going to face higher taxes, as a significant 
portion of their income will be reported on 
the returns of individuals with high levels 
of AGI (see the Office of Tax Analysis 
study). Because the income is reported by 
the entity’s owners, and owners will require 
the conduit to distribute greater amounts 
of cash to cover their tax liabilities, there 
will be less accumulation of assets inside the 
business. The rate change could be particu-
larly harmful to small business conduits, as 
small businesses typically have a more dif-
ficult time obtaining external financing.
Consider the implications for S cor-
porations. Using Statistics of Income balance 
sheet data, I infer the incremental distribu-
tions over the past five years (2005-2009) 
from S corporations that would have been 
required had the top personal statutory tax 
rate been 40%. Presuming that the S corpo-
ration’s tax distribution agreement requires 
funds to be distributed at the top statutory 
tax rate, then all shareholders will receive tax 
distributions at this rate.18
Using the assumption that tax distribu-
tions will increase to 40% from 35%, Figure 
2 illustrates that at the end of five years, S 
corporations would have had $84 billion less 
in accumulated assets inside the business. 
This constitutes approximately 15% of S 
corporations’ working capital. 
It is difficult to estimate how much 
these incremental taxes will cost firms in 
terms of business growth. With the rate 
increase two things could happen. First, tax 
distributions could be increased as described 
above. Second, distributions could be held 
constant and owners could simply pay a 
greater proportion of their distributions 
towards taxes. Over the past five years, 
distributions have been between 55% and 
76% of profits, suggesting that S corporation 
shareholders are receiving distributions in 
excess of what is required to cover tax bur-
dens.19 So, the incremental tax burden cre-
ated by the rate increase could simply result 
in the owners using their non-tax distribu-
tions for taxes rather than fueling economic 
growth through saving, investment in other 
businesses, or consumption.
Tension BeTWeen corporaTe  
and indiViduaL raTe changes 
for Businesses
figure 2:  impacT of indiViduaL Tax raTe increases on s corporaTions
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Working capiTaL 469,051,572 521,828,993 580,441,465 573,861,462 552,099,718
neT income 348,078,943 373,091,660 380,026,863 360,625,661 330,512,003
esTimaTed sharehoLder disTriBuTions 224,872,229 208,278,542 249,963,266 275,374,638 236,609,436
incremenTaL Tax disTriBuTion (5%) 17,403,947 18,654,583 19,001,343 18,031,283 11,044,458
cumuLaTiVe incremenTaL Tax disTriBuTion 17,403,947 35,950,530 54,951,873 72,983,156 84,027,614
cumuLaTiVe disTriBuTion as a % of Working capiTaL 3.7% 6.9% 9.5% 12.7%  15.2% 
Working capital is current assets less current liabilities. net income is aggregate net income from profitable S corporations. estimated shareholder distributions are computed by adding current year’s aggregate 
net income to prior year’s retained earnings and then subtracting current year’s retained earnings. incremental Tax distribution is 5% (the difference between current tax rates and anticipated tax rates on ordinary 
income) of Net Income from profitable S corporations. cummulative incremental Tax distribution is the accumulated incremental distribution from 2005. All amounts are aggregate dollars in thousands. All data 
were collected from Statistics of Income.
through. Said another way, the disparity in tax treatment 
between conduits and C corporations is on the accumu-
lated profits of the enterprise, not the premium created by 
future investors’ anticipated growth in the enterprise.
 18 S corporations are not allowed to make different rates 
of distributions to different shareholders as doing so is 
deemed to create a second class of stock thereby mak-
ing the entity ineligible to be an S corporation.
 19 I roll-forward retained earnings using the Statistics of In-
come for aggregate S corporation tax filings. To estimate 
distributions, I add current year’s earnings to prior year’s 
retained earnings and then subtract the current year’s 
retained earnings.
 20 See Matthew Yglesias “House Republicans Exploit 
Americans’ Misunderstanding of Marginal Tax Rates to 
Sow Fear About Obama’s Proposed Tax Hikes,” www.
slate.com, July 11, 2012.
 21 See Julie B. Cullen and Roger H. Gordon “Taxes and 
Entrepreneurial Risk-Taking: Theory and Evidence for 
the U.S.” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 91, 2007, 
0.1479-1505 and William M. Gentry and Glenn R. Hub-
bard, “Success Taxes, Entrepreneurial Entry, and Innova-
tion,” NBER Working Paper, vol. 1055, 2004.
 22 Martin A. Sullivan’s March 7, 2012 testimony before the 
United States House Ways and Means Committee.
 23 See Chuck Marr’s Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 
study “Cantor Proposal for 20 Percent Business Tax De-
duction Would Provide Windfall for Wealthy, Not Create 
The primary issue is that businesses in pass-
through form are going to effectively face a 
tax rate increase as compared to businesses 
organized as C corporations. So, is it inher-
ently fair that a fast-food franchise owner 
organized as a conduit will now potentially 
face a 40% tax rate on his/her net business 
income whereas an owner organized as a C 
corporation will continue to 35% on his/her 
net business income? Probably not. 
Some surmise that because personal 
taxes on dividends and capital gains are 
also increasing, there is little potential 
inequity, as both conduits and C corpora-
tions will be subject to higher tax burdens. 
While this is true, non-corporate business 
income will face a greater increase for two 
reasons. First, 100% of the conduit entity’s 
income will be taxed at a 5% higher rate. 
By comparison only 65% of the C corpora-
tion’s income will be subject to tax at the 
higher investment income tax rates (also 
increasing 5%; from 15% to 20%), resulting 
in only a 3.25% increase in taxes on the C 
corporation. Second, the second layer of tax 
on C corporations can be deferred to future 
periods (due to retaining earnings inside the 
enterprise), implying that the present value 
of the tax rate increase is much smaller than 
the 3.25%.
Many argue that very few pass-throughs 
will be affected by the individual rate 
increase because only the largest pass-
throughs generate enough taxable income 
to qualify for the upper tax brackets, and 
then very few of these are “true” small busi-
nesses.20 The Office of Tax Analysis study 
above, however, appears to debunk the myth 
that only low levels of conduit income (even 
small business income) will be subject to 
the individual income tax rate increase. But, 
from an economic (as opposed to a political) 
perspective, why does the “small” business 
designation even matter? From an economic 
efficiency perspective, business income 
should carry similar tax burdens regardless 
of the size of the enterprise or its organiza-
tional form. 
Conduit entities do have the option to 
convert to C corporations to take advantage 
of the lower corporate tax rate. This course 
of action has some drawbacks, however. 
First, if the business’s income is highly 
volatile (i.e., net losses can sometimes be 
expected), then being a C corporation will 
prevent the owner from being able to use 
any losses to offset other income. Economic 
theory argues that the ability of owners to 
utilize these losses to reduce their tax bur-
dens encourages entrepreneurial risk taking 
(i.e., the government is providing a subsidy 
equal to the taxes saved).21 
Second, conduit entities offer more flex-
ibility for tax-efficient acquisition structures. 
Many entrepreneurial enterprises require 
external capital to expand the business. This 
capital is either infused by some third-party 
(e.g., private equity) or through the acquisi-
tion of the business by another business 
(e.g., Instagram’s acquisition by Facebook). 
In either case, being in pass-through form 
allows any acquisition premium to be allo-
cated to the business’s assets, which provides 
future tax savings through incremental 
depreciation (called the tax basis “step-up”). 
If the business to be acquired is a C corpo-
ration, gaining the incremental depreciation 
would be prohibitively expensive. I suspect 
that Dell, Apple, Google and Facebook were 
all initially organized as conduit entities that 
took advantage of venture capital investment 
made more affordable by the “step-up.” 
Finally, the benefits of being a C cor-
poration result because the owners intend 
to hold the business for an indefinite period 
and reinvest the earnings into the enterprise. 
Recall that any benefits of the C corporation 
structure increase in the owners’ holding 
period of the business but decrease as the 
business distributes dividends.
Congress does have the option to cre-
ate some special tax treatment for business 
income in pass-through form, to offset 
the rate increase. Examples include House 
Majority Leader Eric Cantor’s proposed 
20% tax deduction for businesses with fewer 
than 500 employees and the provision of 
deductions or credits for a percentage of 
each employee’s wages.22 Critics of these 
proposals argue that the majority of benefits 
will inure to professional service firms (i.e., 
lawyers, doctors, accountants etc.) rather 
than the real “job creating” conduit busi-
nesses.23 
Though the distinction between which 
industries create jobs is unsubstantiated and 
somewhat arbitrary, there is precedent that 
service firms take advantage of organiza-
tional forms to garner tax benefits.24 Hence, 
the ability of service providers to qualify 
for lower tax rates on their net income 
is potentially problematic. Consider that 
salary income is subject to ordinary tax 
rates. There is little a highly compensated 
salaried employee can do to avoid high tax 
rates. However, professional service firms’ 
owners and employees are often the same 
group of individuals. If the net income of 
conduit entities bears a lower tax rate than 
salary income (as would be the case under 
the Cantor proposal), the owners of the 
conduit will be incentivized to reclassify 
their wage income as business income. This 
is because the wages that they pay them-
selves are treated as salary income and will 
face the highest statutory tax rates, whereas 
the income from the business will effectively 
be subject to a lower rate. Assuming that 
the top personal statutory tax rate is 40% 
From an economic efficiency 
perspective, business income 
should carry similar tax 
burdens regardless of the size 
of the enterprise or its organi-
zational form.
Jobs,” May 22, 2012.
 24 Professional Service Corporations (or PSCs) are C cor-
porations that have a substantial portion of their profits 
derived from professional services (i.e., law, medicine, 
architecture etc.). Their profits are taxed at the highest 
corporate statutory tax rate.  PSCs originated because 
professional service provides realized that they could 
incorporate and have their customers pay a variety of 
different corporations for their services thereby taking 
advantage of the progressive corporate tax rate. 
 25 If the owner-employee received the incremental $100,000 
he/she would have $60,000 after taxes. By reducing sal-
ary, the employee increases the income of the conduit by 
$100,000 which will only create an incremental $32,000 
in taxes. 
 26 See the Domestic Manufacturing Deduction from the 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 as an example of 
unwieldy legislation. 
 27 See Emily Maltby and Angus Loten “Cliff Fix Hits Small 
Businesses,” The Wall Street Journal, January 3, 2013.
 
and that the top tax rate on business income 
would be 32% (assuming 20% deduction 
of net income), for each dollar an owner-
employee reduces his/her salary (which 
increases the net income of the conduit) and 
then increases cash distributions from the 
business, he/she saves $0.08. Ignoring any 
payroll taxes, for a $100,000 salary reduction 
and accompanying increase in distribution, 
this strategy yields the owner-employee an 
additional $8,000.25 
Any proposal intended to alleviate the 
potential tax rate increase on conduit busi-
nesses needs to be carefully crafted and nar-
rowly targeted so as to benefit the appropri-
ate constituency. Although such an endeavor 
is worthy, any proposal is likely going to 
have to be extremely unwieldy in order 
to prevent abuse. The complexity of such 
legislation will be confounded by the lack 
of clear definition as to what constitutes a 
“small business.” As many factions will have 
their proverbial fingers in the pot, I worry 
that any resulting business tax relief legisla-
tion will be so complex that “true” small 
businesses will be unwilling to invest the 
time to take advantage of the tax benefits 
and so the legislation will be for naught.26
Base Broadening Versus raTe 
increases
Although both parties agree that revenues 
need to be raised, they are in complete 
disagreement as to how to accomplish this 
feat. Democrats insist on rate increases; 
Republicans insist on eliminating deduc-
tions. Although both proposals will raise 
revenues, I conjecture that the elimination 
of deductions, rather than the imposition of 
rate increases, will have a slightly more con-
gruous effect across businesses in different 
organizational forms. Clearly, the Demo-
crats’ proposal (inadvertently?) taxes conduit 
businesses more heavily than C corporation 
businesses. Reducing individual deductions 
systematically applies to all business owners 
regardless of their organizational structures. 
For example, both C corporation and con-
duit owners will face the same limits on the 
deductibility of home mortgage interest. 
But conduit businesses may still face a 
bigger tax hike for at least two reasons. First, 
the proposed limitation of deductions phases 
in when taxpayers report $200,000 or more 
of adjusted gross income. Because conduit 
owners report all of the income on their per-
sonal returns, they will likely hit the deduc-
tion limitation thresholds more frequently 
than C corporation owners (recall that C 
corporation owners only report dividends 
and capital gains on their personal returns). 
Second, some of the proposed limita-
tions of deductions stem from expenses 
generated from their businesses. For 
example, charitable contributions are treated 
as flowing through the conduit entity onto 
the returns of the owners. So, if their busi-
ness makes charitable contributions, then 
these deductions will be subject to limitation 
under the more stringent individual rules 
rather than the less stringent C corporation 
rules. 
State and local income taxes are another 
example of where deductions will be more 
limited for conduits than C corporations. 
Unfortunately, the Republicans have been 
rather sparse on the details of their deduc-
tion limitation proposal. Though it may be 
slightly preferable to conduit businesses as 
compared to across-the-board individual 
rate increases, I worry that once the incre-
mental compliance burden is considered that 
the Republican proposal will be scrapped.
V.  
summary
Pass-through businesses represent a sub-
stantial portion of aggregate taxable income 
from businesses. The conduit organiza-
tional form is in place to reduce the effects 
of double taxation on business profits, 
particularly on organizations that have less 
opportunity to raise affordable external 
capital. However, recently proposed tax 
legislation reduces taxation on C corpora-
tion businesses while raising them on the 
conduit sector. Although C corporation tax 
reform is needed, it seems unfair to pay for 
such overhaul by increasing the taxes on 
the income of conduit businesses. Although 
there are no precise estimates of the effect of 
the individual income tax rates on conduit 
businesses’ growth and productivity, there is 
much anecdotal evidence that small conduit 
businesses could reduce hiring and/or capital 
investment.27
Perhaps the disparate tax increase on 
conduits could be partially mitigated by the 
establishment of a threshold for assessing 
the higher tax rates on individuals before 
non-corporate business income. This would 
at least limit the conduit income subject to 
the higher tax rates to individuals who have 
substantial amounts of income from non-
business sources. However, there will have to 
be some provision to limit conduit business 
owners from re-characterizing their salary 
income as conduit income to avoid higher 
taxes on their salaries. Overall, the goal of 
any reform should be to tax similar types of 
income at similar rates. 
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